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STERN V. MARSHALL PANEL
Bernard Bo Bollinger*
Daniel Bussel**
The Honorable James E. Massey***
MR. ZISHOLTZ: Welcome back. We’re going to go ahead and get started
again with our second panel. We have our exclusive Stern v. Marshall panel,
and I’m sure we’re going to learn a lot from our panel here today. I’d like to
introduce our moderator, Mr. Bo Bollinger. Bo is a shareholder at Buchalter
Nemer and is joining us all the way from Los Angeles, California. Bo is Chair
of Buchalter Nemer’s Insolvency and Financial Solutions Practice Group and a
member of the firm’s Board of Directors. He is also Co-Chair of the firm’s
Continuing Legal Education Committee. Bo regularly represents creditors and
acquirers in real estate-related bankruptcy cases, including multiple
engagements for one of the largest real estate development companies in
southern California. Bo earned his J.D. at Loyola Law School and received his
B.A. from the University of Southern California. Thank you, Bo, for joining
us, and we’re excited for this panel.
MR. BOLLINGER: Thank you, Jeremy. Good morning, everybody. Let me
take a second to introduce the rest of the esteemed panel here. To my far right
is the Honorable James E. Massey. Judge Massey graduated from Emory here
in 1965 for undergrad, went to Columbia Law School in 1968, practiced law
for about 25 years, and then became a judge in 1993. He tried to retire a few
years ago and was asked to come back. He was recalled and is still sitting on
the bench here in Atlanta, so I know a number of you are probably familiar
with Judge Massey.
We also have on the panel, to my immediate right, Daniel Bussel. Dan is a
member of Klee, Tuchin, Bogdanoff & Stern, a graduate of the University of
Pennsylvania and Stanford Law School. He clerked for the Honorable Sandra
Day O’Connor and the Honorable Stephen Breyer. He is currently a professor
at U.C.L.A. Law School teaching bankruptcy, commercial law, and contracts.
He’s been an expert consultant and witness in numerous bankruptcy-related
*
**
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matters, participated in the preparation of amicus curiae briefs, and he also
submitted briefs on behalf of the Marshall estate in the Supreme Court case in
Stern, so he’s pretty intimately familiar with these issues, as you might
imagine.
I should also start—because each of us is still involved in issues and the
impact of Stern—I need to give you a disclaimer that we’re all involved in
these types of matters. We have partners at our firms who are involved in all
sides of these issues, so while we’ll talk today about these issues, we are just
talking about them for discussion purposes. Nothing of what we say is really
for affirmation—
MR. BUSSEL: Or should be held against us.
MR. BOLLINGER: Or should be held against us. So we’re happy to talk
about these issues, but particularly Judge Massey is not giving an advisory
opinion from this panel this morning.
The way I thought we’d organize this is to have Dan talk for a few minutes
about Stern, its procedural history, and background. Then we’ll go through a
discussion of some of the cases that we have in the materials. If you have those
materials handy, it might be a little bit helpful for you because we’re going to
go through them in the order that they’re presented in the materials. We’re not
going to talk about all of them, but we are going to go through those, and it
might help you to have that synopsis in front of you. Then after we finish the
discussion of six or eight of those cases, Judge Massey will talk about some of
the practical implications—how Stern might impact practitioners. I think some
of the law students here have Stern as one of their moot court issues, and so we
might have questions about that. We should have about ten minutes at the end
to address questions. When we do those questions, I’ve been asked to have
people who are interested in asking questions to walk up to the microphone
and ask the questions from the microphone. So when we get to that point,
please prepare yourself to get up and walk to those microphones.
I also have one additional disclaimer. If you think that we’re going to solve
this issue for you today, you are sorely mistaken. We are glad to talk about it,
but as you’re going to find out, it’s really a mess, and it’s something that is
going to take a long time before these issues are truly resolved. As a
practitioner, I’m sure you have a lot of questions that we’re just not going to be
able to answer for you, although we can give you the different sides of these
particular issues.
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So with that said, Dan, why don’t you go ahead and give us the background
about Stern?
MR. BUSSEL: Thank you, Bo. First, I want to thank the Emory people for
putting on this panel. It’s a great pleasure for me personally to be on the panel,
and particularly to talk about Stern v. Marshall1 in a law school setting because
I remember thirty years ago when the Marathon2 case came down, I was in law
school, and the same sort of confusion, distress, and panic on the part of much
of the bankruptcy community descended on us all. It really motivated my
interest in bankruptcy at the very beginning because I remember how high
profile the issues were back then.
As Bo says, I think the takeaway lessons are that, one, for the immediate
future, the Supreme Court clearly has created a litigation nightmare for
everybody in the bankruptcy community, and it’s something that we’re going
to be dealing with for at least several years—probably more than several years
going forward. The second point is that we’re starting to get some pretty clear
idea of how the issues are settling out at the bankruptcy court and the district
court level, and Bo is going to talk some more about that after I finish my
background talk. But nobody knows where the courts of appeal and ultimately
the Supreme Court are going to come out on the host of issues that have been
raised in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, and so
there’s just a lot of uncertainty and speculation about how it’s all going to
settle out.
I guess the final point is, Stern v. Marshall illustrates how sorely we miss
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor because it’s pretty clear, based on her
jurisprudence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, that the 5-4 would’ve gone the
other way if you substitute O’Connor for Alito.
Okay, with that being said, let’s talk for a minute on how we got to where
we are. You really have to go back, unfortunately, to the Bankruptcy Act of
18983 to have any real understanding of these issues. The jurisdictional
underpinnings of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, there was a fundamental
division in the statutes (statutory, not constitutional) between so-called
summary and plenary jurisdiction, and so the basic framework was that, to the
extent that there were proceedings dealing with the property of the estate, there
1
2
3

Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
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was a kind of in rem jurisdiction that the then-bankruptcy referees had over the
property. They could dispose of the property and deal with the property and
deal with distribution of the property and settle claims against the property, but
pretty much everything else that involved certainly third parties, that didn’t
involve creditors and that couldn’t be characterized in one way or another as
dealing with the res, with the property that was in the bankruptcy estate and
indeed augmenting the estate was, to the extent that there was jurisdiction to do
it, the jurisdiction was so-called plenary jurisdiction. That meant that the suit
had to proceed before the federal district judge or even the state court, but not
in front of the referee.
The system struggled with this distinction between summary and plenary
jurisdiction for eighty years. It was a very difficult issue at the margins to
determine whether any particular proceeding would be characterized as
summary or plenary. One of the great advances in the 1978 Code4—one of the
crown jewels of the Code—was the complete reworking and repair of the
jurisdictional underpinnings of the bankruptcy system—the creation of a
freestanding bankruptcy court and the vesting of this very broad jurisdiction to
handle all the matters before the bankruptcy judge.
There was thought given during that reform effort about whether we need
to worry about Article III. The decision was made not to appoint the
bankruptcy judges as Article III judges, but rather use Congress’s inherent
power under Article I to constitute the courts with non-Article III judges. And
so the new jurisdictional provisions were tested in litigation all over the
country, and in 1982 or 1983, the Supreme Court finally was faced with the
issue in the Marathon5 case of whether or not the jurisdictional provisions of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 were constitutional. In a stunning but
confusing plurality decision in Marathon, the Court said no, that the vesting of
the full breadth of the bankruptcy jurisdiction constituted a vesting of the
judicial power of the United States in these new bankruptcy courts, and the
judicial power of the United States under Article III of the Constitution had to
be vested in judges nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and
appointed for life.
And so there was panic. The Supreme Court actually stayed its judgment in
Marathon—it stayed it twice in order to give the system an opportunity to
adjust. The hope was that Congress would reconstitute the jurisdictional
4
5

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50.
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underpinnings of the court in a way that was consistent with the ruling in
Marathon during the period of the stay. Congress didn’t act, and so eventually
the stay lapsed and the judiciary moved in to kind of fill the gap by constituting
what probably was an un-Constitutional emergency rule under the auspices of
the Judicial Conference of the United States that created, for the first time, this
distinction between core and non-core jurisdiction.
Eventually, in 1984, Congress essentially adopted the emergency rule as a
statute with some modification, but essentially codified this distinction
between core proceedings and non-core proceedings.6 The decision that was
made in both the emergency rule and in the BAFJA in the 1984 amendments
was to construe Marathon very narrowly. And so the notion was, well, the
Supreme Court has said that we cannot take an action that is based on state
law, that is against a non-creditor of the estate, and likely has a jury trial right
attached to it—we can’t vest that in the bankruptcy court. That kind of suit, we
understand, has to go to the federal district court. Basically everything else that
the bankruptcy judges do, we’re going to characterize as a core proceeding.
And so they have this long enumeration that people are, I assume, generally
familiar with in the statute of all the different kinds of matters that can arise in
a bankruptcy case and characterizes all of those as core proceedings.
So obviously, BAFJA was tested in the bankruptcy courts and in the district
courts and in the courts of appeal as to whether or not it really conformed to
Marathon, whether this very narrow reading of Marathon—that Marathon was
really about just this one particular kind of lawsuit that couldn’t proceed in the
bankruptcy court—was really a proper interpretation of the decision.
The conclusion in the bankruptcy courts and the district courts and the
courts of appeal at that time was uniformly, yes, it works. In fact, there was
kind of a relief that we’re kind of past the Marathon issue. And people felt
especially comfortable with that because of these two O’Connor decisions,
Schor7 and Thomas,8 that came down in the late 1980s that seemed to back
away. Remember, Marathon was just a plurality decision; the membership of
the Court had changed, and Schor and Thomas indicated that the Court, or at
least the majority of the Court, had turned into a much more pragmatic and
functional analysis of Article III. And the analysis in those cases, albeit dealing
6 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, § 104(a), Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 340.
7 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
8 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
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not with bankruptcy but dealing with administrative agencies, to the extent that
the vesting of this additional jurisdiction in the non-Article III adjudicator
didn’t implicate Article III values, didn’t undermine the independence of the
federal judiciary in some material way, and had a good, practical rationale. It
was okay, and so people kind of breathed a sigh of relief and moved on. People
stopped testing the jurisdictional predicate of the BAFJA or the
constitutionality of the BAFJA. People accepted the statute pretty much as it
was written as establishing the allocation of jurisdiction between the
bankruptcy court and the federal district court.
There were subsequent events in the Supreme Court. There was the
Granfinanciera9 case in the early 1990s. In Granfinanciera, the Supreme Court
said, well, the Seventh Amendment jury trial right has to, in order to preserve
jury trial as a viable institution, go through this exercise of analyzing whether
any particular lawsuit is best analogized to a common law action in 1791. And
we look at fraudulent transfer law, and fraudulent transfer law is very ancient,
and so fraudulent transfer law looks to us like an action at law. And so the
framers, in 1791 when they said jury trial rights shall be preserved in the
federal system, that means they’re fraudulent transfer. They would’ve thought
fraudulent transfer fell into that category. And so that was somewhat disturbing
to people—that now the thought that we’d have to have jury trials, maybe even
in Article I courts, and there was a dispute as to whether you could do it in the
bankruptcy court or in the federal district court. And people essentially came to
the solution that, well, to the extent that there was actually going to be a jury
trial, if there was a jury trial right, that jury trial had to be conducted in the
federal district court, but basically everything short of that could be done in the
bankruptcy court.
And it turned out that the system was pretty stable at this point because
people really didn’t want jury trials in fraudulent transfer actions or in most of
the other kinds of litigation that occurred regularly in the bankruptcy court.
And so unless you had a lawsuit that was a Marathon lawsuit that was a purely
non-core lawsuit, or you had a jury trial, the proceeding would take place
before the bankruptcy judge, and the bankruptcy judge could finally resolve it.
It turned out that there was very little non-core litigation, very few reports and
recommendations, and very little withdrawal of the reference except in the
narrow category of cases where people not only had jury trial rights but chose
to exercise them.
9

Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
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So that’s pre-Stern. So what happens in Stern v. Marshall, without going
through the whole Bleak House explanation of what happened in Stern v.
Marshall, which could consume easily an hour and a half just going through
the facts to much amusement, but still, I think you’ve probably all been there
by now. What happened is that Pierce Marshall filed a proof of claim in Anna
Nicole Smith’s California bankruptcy based on defamatory statements that she
had made regarding his conduct towards her (his stepmother, I guess) in
connection with the trust that was created by her husband and his father. Anna
Nicole counterclaimed with a tort claim asserting that she had been wronged
by Pierce in connection with the trust. Under basic civil procedure, this is a
compulsory counterclaim because it arises out of the same nucleus of operative
facts, so it’s deemed a compulsory counterclaim under the Rules.10
The bankruptcy court went ahead and disallowed the defamation claim and
found it was without merit and gave judgment to Anna Nicole, then went on to
adjudicate the counterclaim and gave further judgment to her for affirmative
recovery of something like $450 million. So it comes up to the Supreme Court
of the United States now for the second time, and the disposition of the claim
itself is not in the case anymore—not challenged. The only issue is the
counterclaim judgment. What the Supreme Court says is, well, we read the
statute, and the statute is very clear that jurisdiction over counterclaims is
vested in the bankruptcy court and we’re not going to rewrite the statute. The
statute says this is core and that it should proceed in the bankruptcy court, but
judgment on the counterclaim was still, even though it was characterized as a
statutory matter as a court proceeding, an exercise of the judicial power of the
United States, and therefore, the right to enter a final judgment on such a
matter had to be vested in the federal district court.
And so, unless—and the “unless” is whether it falls within one of three
exceptions. Well, of the three exceptions, two of them are obviously not
applicable. There’s an historical exception for territorial courts; the bankruptcy
court is not a territorial court. That’s not going to work. There was an
exception for courts martial, but this is not a military case. And then there was
this sort of vague exception for matters of public right. And so the question is,
could you fit the counterclaim into that exception as a matter of public right?
What the Supreme Court says in Stern v. Marshall is, no, it’s not a matter
of public right because this is a claim for affirmative recovery and it is not

10

See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a).

STERN V. MARSHALL PANEL GALLEYFINAL

316

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

6/8/2012 9:48 AM

[Vol. 28

necessary to the adjudication of a claim against the estate. It does not deal with
something that is currently the res of the bankruptcy. And we know that it’s
not necessary to the adjudication of the claim because the claim was
disallowed before they ever got to the counterclaim, so clearly it wasn’t
necessary to determine whether or not the claim was valid because you’d
already taken care of that and you could’ve moved on, and yet you went ahead
and adjudicated this additional matter that constituted an exercise of judicial
power.
So why is this so disruptive? Why is this so destabilizing? And the answer
to that, I think, is that it explodes what had been the consensus about the
validity of the narrow interpretation of Marathon codified in the 1984
amendments and subsequently upheld by every court in the system below the
Supreme Court of the United States.
And so the key elements of that are, well, it’s not just about state law
anymore—state law claims. And the reason it seems that it’s not just about
state law anymore is because the court assimilates the Seventh Amendment
holding in Granfinanciera to the standard for Article III judicial power and
says, well, it’s the same test. And so in Granfinanciera, there was a jury trial
right and it had to take place in a federal district court, and Granfinanciera
involved a federal transfer action under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code11 which
was a matter of federal law, not a matter of state law.
And the second aspect of it is that it exploded this idea that, well, if it
wasn’t an action against a creditor—that was an essential part of what the
problem was in Marathon because in Stern v. Marshall, Marshall was a
creditor. He filed a claim. And so to say that, well, Marathon is just about state
law and just about actions against non-creditors isn’t really viable after Stern v.
Marshall. So we find out now thirty years later that BAFJA just doesn’t work.
The purported allocation of jurisdiction between federal district court and
bankruptcy court is not consistent with the Constitution. And so the definition
of core sweeps in things that are matters that are not of public right and
therefore not within the authority of the bankruptcy court.
So what is within the authority of the bankruptcy court now in the wake of
Stern v. Marshall? That’s the million dollar question. There are really two
competing views out there that are polar opposites, and then there’s a lot of
attempt to strive toward some sort of middle ground. So what are the polar
11

11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006).
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views? The most intellectually coherent view is the view expressed by Justice
Scalia in his concurrence. Justice Scalia says, look, the matter of public right
exception is rooted in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,12 back from the 19th century.
And what it was, was a logical deduction from the sovereign immunity of the
United States. And so the notion was that, if the government authorizes a suit
against itself, it is waiving sovereign immunity. Since it could choose not to be
sued at all, it can elect which forum the suit will proceed in, and it can assign
the matter to a non-Article III forum because it was privileged to say there
shouldn’t be any litigation of this nature at all against the United States.
When you’re talking about “of public right,” what that means to Justice
Scalia is, it involves the government. And so if that’s the definition of what is
“of public right,” and if the only exceptions are territorial courts, courts
martial, and “of public right,” then almost nothing that goes on in bankruptcy
is of public right. Maybe, he says, maybe because of the long history here, I’d
be willing to look the other way on processing claims against the estate. And
beyond that, it’s all about adjudicating private rights among private parties, and
so it’s all exercises of judicial power, and it all has to be vested in an Article III
court. There’s no applicable exception.
It’s theoretically coherent. It is extremely impractical as a view. It’s really
calling for essentially an abolition of the decision to vest broad jurisdiction in
the bankruptcy courts and allow bankruptcy judges to handle the cases.
The other view that’s out there is the view probably espoused by the other
people on this panel, which we’ll characterize as the bankruptcy lawyers’ view.
The bankruptcy lawyers’ view is that a matter of public right is everything
that’s in the Bankruptcy Code and everything that is related to a bankruptcy
case except those things which the Supreme Court has specifically told us are
not matters of public right. So they’ve told us in Marathon that if you have a
state law action against a non-creditor, that’s a non-core action. That’s a matter
of private right. Well, we’ll say that that’s outside the bankruptcy judge’s
jurisdiction.
Now we’ve heard in Stern v. Marshall that, as to counterclaims and
counterclaims only, if there’s a counterclaim that calls for affirmative recovery
that is not necessary to the adjudication, then as to that kind of an action, it’s
report and recommendation, and it has to go to a district judge. Maybe because
of the discussion of Granfinanciera, maybe we would be willing to concede,
12

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
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although I’m not really sure that the bar is completely there yet, but we’d be
willing to concede that a fraudulent transfer action is outside the core
jurisdiction, at least if it’s against a non-creditor. Because remember,
Granfinanciera is a non-creditor. There was no proof of claim filed by the
defendant in Granfinanciera. Everything else is okay for the bankruptcy court
to determine. And again, Bo will talk about the cases in more detail, but
essentially that’s where the current cases are coming out. The bankruptcy
courts and the district courts have basically concluded that we’re going to read
Stern v. Marshall as narrowly as possible.
And so then the million dollar question is, what will the courts of appeal
say? The virtue of the bankruptcy lawyers’ view is that it’s very practical. It’s
extremely practical. It is theoretically incoherent. There’s no logic that drives
you to the conclusion that the Stern v. Marshall cause of action is outside the
constitutional core jurisdiction, but everything else is in. There’s no
explanation as to why that should be so, other than the Supreme Court has said
it is so.
And so the question is, is there an intellectually coherent way, without
going all the way to the Scalia position of saying nothing except matters that
actually involve the government are public right, that allows you to draw a line
that puts Stern v. Marshall on one side and most of the things that we really
care about that the bankruptcy system does on a daily basis on the right side of
the line? And so this is going to be the project of the courts of appeal, whether
they’re going to be able to draw that line or whether they’re going to fold into
one of the two existing positions. I don’t think the Scalia view is ultimately
going to prevail because it’s so impractical that I just don’t think it’s going to
go there. But if there is a middle way that emerges, I think it’s very hard on an
intellectual basis to adopt this very, very narrow interpretation of Stern v.
Marshall.
And so what are the possibilities here? Well, one possibility is to come up
with a kind of functional view that ties Article III values in some way to a
division of jurisdiction that leaves Stern v. Marshall on one side and most
things on the other side. And nobody has really successfully come up with a
theory. There doesn’t seem to be a theory out there that ties independence of
the federal judiciary and separation of powers values to that division of
responsibility. Because after all, what is the separation of powers value that’s
implicated by allowing a tort claim to be adjudicated by a non-Article III
adjudicator? Most tort claims in our system are adjudicated by non-Article III
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adjudicators. They’re determined by state judges who don’t have Article III
protection. They’re determined by juries. They’re determined by arbitrators. So
it’s hard to see what’s so important to separation of powers that would say,
“Oh, yes, that’s got to be on that side of the line, everything else on the other
side of the line.” So it seems to be a broader principle.
So the other possibility that’s put forward for drawing a line in a
meaningful way is to look back to tradition and say, well, we don’t have an
intellectual line, but we have 100 years of practice. And what that essentially
means is going back. And it’s the reason I started with the 1898 Act and
summary versus plenary jurisdiction, going back to what was the division of
authority between the referees in bankruptcy under the 1898 Act and the
district court judges.
So it seems that the Supreme Court is comfortable with that. And the
reason it seems they’re comfortable with that is they rely, in Stern v. Marshall,
on Katchen v. Landy,13 which is one of the great cases dealing with this
summary/plenary division. Nobody really understood exactly how Katchen v.
Landy was applied. It was a confusing mess. But anyway, that was the
landmark case. And the court says, we’re not touching Katchen v. Landy. And
so the suggestion is made that where the line really is, going forward, is dust
off your 14th Edition of Collier’s,14 look at the jurisdictional provisions under
the 1898 Act, read the old cases and figure out whether your action would’ve
been summary or plenary under the old system. And if it was summary under
the old system, you’re okay. And if it was plenary under the old system, you
have a problem. It may no longer be within the authority of the bankruptcy
judge to finally determine the matter.
I see I’ve burned a lot of time. Why don’t I let you go?
MR. BOLLINGER: Thank you, Dan. Thank you for that eloquent
explanation. Now let’s see how all of that works in practice. I also want to
refer again to the materials. The materials start at page forty-three. What we’ve
done with those materials is we have categorized the types of cases by matter,
so that if you in practice have a particular type of issue, you can see if there are
cases that have come down on those issues.

13
14

Katchen v. Landy, 328 U.S. 323 (1966).
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1978).
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I also want to sort of give you a little bit of a timeline because some of
these cases were decided at different points in that timeline. Stern was decided
June 23rd of 2011. So we’re about eight months out from Stern. So as we go
through each of these cases that I’m going to focus on, I’ll talk about where
they are in that timeline and how if that impacted the analysis at all.
The first case that we’re going to talk about is the one under chapter 11
plan confirmation issues. That’s In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa.15 It’s a
Middle District of Florida case, August 30th, 2011, so we’re talking about ten
weeks after Stern. In this case, it concerns plan confirmation and some of the
elements of a plan. There was a two-day evidentiary hearing on plan
confirmation. The court approved the plan but did not approve the release of
non-debtor guarantors. Instead, he put in place a lock-up provision, a four-year
stay on actions of the guarantee, but the guarantors couldn’t transfer assets
during that time period. So the question was whether or not this lock-up
provision, this element of the plan, was within the court’s jurisdiction under
Stern. The court goes through a long, detailed analysis. This is the one that
goes through Stern on almost a point-by-point basis, and determined that
ultimately Stern should be interpreted narrowly and that the lock-up provision
was an integral part of the plan and thus falls within core jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(L).16 The court also described the concept of consent and
ended up concluding that, because these guarantors had the controlling interest
in the plan proponent, they in fact had consented to the jurisdiction of the
court.
So, Judge Massey or Dan, any thoughts about this case and how this sort of
fits in the broad spectrum of Stern?
MR. BUSSEL: Well, we haven’t really talked about consent, but the consent
ruling has to be right in this case because what happens in this case is you had
people who are promoting a plan of reorganization, and they put it forward,
and they want the bankruptcy judge to approve it. And when the bankruptcy
judge does something that they don’t like in respect of the confirmation of the
plan, all of a sudden they say, oh, Stern v. Marshall. You don’t have the
authority to do it anymore. And I think that under any kind of rational view of
the way the system has to operate, that can’t work. If a plaintiff or a plan
proponent is seeking affirmative relief, it may be for the defendant or an
opposing party to raise Stern v. Marshall, but I don’t see how they can come in
15
16

In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(L) (2006).
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and say, after they find out that it’s not going their way, that the bankruptcy
court doesn’t have authority. So in that sense, I think the case was kind of
over-determined.
If you take away the consent issue, the underlying Stern v. Marshall issue
is a very interesting issue because now the question is, okay, this is not a
counterclaim. This is not under (C); this is under (L). So does Stern v.
Marshall have any application to (L)? Well, the bankruptcy lawyers will say,
“No, (L) was a different letter than (C).”17 But there’s no explanation as to
why. It’s just it’s a different letter. And so that’s sort of my quick take on it.
Did you have a view, Judge Massey?
JUDGE MASSEY: Well, I’ll talk a little bit more in a minute if I’ve got some
time about consent, but I think there’s some reason to be concerned about how
you determine whether consent is given. If you’re interested in making sure
that you get a final judgment in the bankruptcy court, the best way to do that is
to get the other side to explicitly—in writing—say that they have consented to
the bankruptcy judge making the determination. It wouldn’t be enough to say,
“I consent to the bankruptcy judge’s jurisdiction.” I think Stern v. Marshall
makes it clear that the court is looking at subject matter jurisdiction differently
than allocating the job of making the final judgment between the district judge
and the bankruptcy judge.
MR. BUSSEL: How do you provoke the other side to consent to the
jurisdiction?
JUDGE MASSEY: You’re going to have to talk them into it. Maybe you
provoke them into it by proposing a settlement that they can’t refuse, such that
you don’t even need to get there. Maybe you have the ability to delay the thing
long enough so that it really hurts the other side and so you say, “Okay, you
won’t consent. I’m going to see to it that we stay in this court as long as we can
and then stay in the district court as long as we can. You may get your
judgment, but it will be ten years from now.”
MR. BOLLINGER: We have at least one other case here that talks about the
issue of consent, and the concept, almost, of forum shopping—that Stern
shouldn’t permit you to go with the bankruptcy judge as long as you like the
rulings, but as soon as you don’t, you raise the Stern flag and say, well, I want

17

See id. § 157(b)(C), (L).
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a new judge. So that seemed to be the case in that case, also in the Bayonne
Medical Center18 case that we’ll talk about.
Let’s talk for a second first about non-dischargeability, and the Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Franceschini case.19 That’s a bankruptcy case out of Texas in
2012, this year, and this was a situation where the owner of some car
dealerships transferred about $1.6 million to family members, despite those
assets being encumbered by Ford Motor Credit’s liens. The court held that
those transfers were non-dischargeable because they were done willfully and
maliciously. The court concluded that the right to discharge is established by
the Bankruptcy Code and is central to the public bankruptcy scheme, and
bankruptcy courts have the authority to make such decisions pursuant to their
in rem jurisdiction. So that is the concept of non-dischargeability. But what
about actually determining the amount of the non-dischargeable claim? Judge
Massey, I know you—
JUDGE MASSEY: That’s the problem. That’s the Stern problem with regard
to § 523 claims.20 The creditor may not agree to that. They may think that
they’ve got a better shot in state court in front of the jury in getting a big
judgment. And quite often you see cases filed where there’s litigation that is
based on alleged fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, or
some sort of willful and malicious injury. If you get into that, for example, in
the context of defamation, figuring out exactly what the damages are is not an
easy thing, and it’s usually something that’s decided by a jury. So one of the
concepts that I would urge you to think about in analyzing whether a core issue
might really be a non-core issue—and this is not the only thing—but is this the
sort of thing that normally would get decided somewhere else, and it doesn’t
really matter too much to creditors or to the estate what the amount is. If you
looked at it that way, you might conclude that, if there’s dispute over the
amount, it would have to be tried elsewhere.
MR. BUSSEL: For the historians among you, under the 1898 Act, the nondischargeability action was a matter of summary jurisdiction, but the
determination of the amount was plenary suit. So that feeds right into this

18 Bayonne Med. Ctr. v. Bayonne/Omni Dev., LLC (In re Bayonne Med. Ctr.), No. 07-15195 (MS), 2011
Bankr. LEXIS 4748 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2011).
19 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Franceschini (In re Franceschini), No. 10-30550, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 156
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2012).
20 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006) (listing debts that are exempt from discharge).
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argument that Stern v. Marshall essentially constitutionalizes the division of
jurisdiction that existed before the Bankruptcy Code was enacted.
JUDGE MASSEY: Let me tell you one quick idea about this, just as a
practice concept. Let’s say that the parties have tried the case to the jury in the
state court—no interrogatories to the jury. There were two claims. One was
contract and one was tort. The defendant files bankruptcy, and the claim is that
the tort claim is a fraudulent claim—the defendant committed fraud. So they
would want you to rule that the debt is non-dischargeable because there’s an
issue of preclusion, of claim preclusion, of collateral estoppel. The defendant
cannot come back and re-try it the second time. The judge could certainly try
the question of: if you had to start all over again and determine whether or not
the fraud claim was such that the debt for fraud would be non-dischargeable.
That doesn’t determine the amount of the claim. Now what do you do? You’ve
got to go back in state court and have another trial all over again to determine
how much of the judgment was for contract damages and how much of it was
for fraud damages. It’s a mess.
MR. BUSSEL: If that’s what the Constitution requires.
MR. BOLLINGER: It’s a mess. That’s the circumstance that we’re in. I think
we’ll switch over to the fraudulent transfer claims that Dan talked about. We
only have two cases listed in these materials that have gotten to the court of
appeals level. One of them is the Executive Benefits Insurance Co. v. Arkison
case,21 Ninth Circuit, November 4th of 2011. All this is, is the statement that
the appellate court has taken this and they asked for arguments to address the
following questions: does Stern v. Marshall prohibit bankruptcy courts from
entering final binding judgment in a fraudulent conveyance action? And if so,
may the court hear the proceeding and submit a report and recommendation to
the district court in lieu of entering a final judgment? Dan, any thoughts about
why it is they’d ask for briefing, and any predictions on how you think this
might go?
MR. BUSSEL: Well, Judge Kosinski is on the panel. He’s the chief judge on
the Ninth Circuit. Judge Kosinski has a deep and abiding interest in bankruptcy
matters generally. I’d be very surprised if he wasn’t thinking very hard about
finding that the fraudulent transfer actions were outside the jurisdiction. There
were a number of amicus submitted in response to this public call for
21

2011).

Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 661 F.3d 476 (9th Cir.
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briefing—actually one by one of the people that worked with me on Stern v.
Marshall. And so they’ve gotten the briefs now, and it’s in front of the Ninth
Circuit. My guess is that there will be a decision relatively soon. His chambers
works pretty quickly, so I anticipate within a short period of time there will be
a Ninth Circuit holding. If I had to bet on it, I would say that probably it’s
going to be that fraudulent transfer actions are not within the core jurisdiction,
or the constitutional core, whatever you want to call it.
MR. BOLLINGER: It would just be nice to have some ruling of some kind
for us to be able to follow. Maybe we’re getting there eventually.
MR. BUSSEL: That may not be the one that most people want.
MR. BOLLINGER: The issue of judicial efficiency really comes up in the
Adelphia Recovery Trust case,22 decided on January 30th of 2012. In that
situation, there were seven years of litigation over a fraudulent transfer claim,
and then Stern came up and the question was, could this judge enter a final
judgment? And the court, citing Granfinanciera, said, it’s a private right. Stern
clearly implied that the bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to enter
final judgment on the fraudulent conveyance claims entered here. And then it
goes through an analysis, ultimately determining that withdrawing the
reference—he determined that he could enter proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law in the manner authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)23
because withdrawing the reference due to uncertainty caused by Stern is a
drastic remedy that will hamper judicial efficiency. Having to redo seven years
worth of trial—when the bankruptcy judge has all of the history of these
cases—just doesn’t seem to make sense as a matter of judicial economy. Any
thoughts about that?
JUDGE MASSEY: If it’s unconstitutional, it’s unconstitutional. You can’t
just wink at it if you want to have a Constitution that means anything. Part of
the problem is that figuring out what the Constitution means is not all that
easy, and what the methodology is for interpreting it is not all that easy. I think
what we’ve seen over the last few years with regard to the majority on the
Court is that the concept that you can look at a statute like the Bankruptcy
Code and analyze any constitutional problems based on some sort of pragmatic
approach, it seems at this point to be out. What’s odd to me is that when you
22 Adelphia Recovery Trust v. FLP Group, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6847 (PAC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10804
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012).
23 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (2006).
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go back to the Marathon case, there were three justices in dissent: Chief
Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Powell. They were probably the
three most conservative, or certainly among the most conservative members of
the Court, and they were willing to uphold the statute when bankruptcy judges
were to be appointed by the President, and anything that even smelled like
bankruptcy could come in front of a bankruptcy judge.
MR. BUSSEL: Totally flipped. In Marathon, the principal author of the
opinion was Justice Brennan, the most liberal justice we’ve had in two
generations.
JUDGE MASSEY: So now we’re back. It’s the other way around. It’s just
odd.
MR. BUSSEL: It’s funny, the ideological—
JUDGE MASSEY: It’s just hard to figure out.
MR. BUSSEL: Doesn’t consent go a ways here, though? These people have
litigated for seven years on the assumption that the bankruptcy judge is going
to render a final judgment. At some point, isn’t there some implicit waiver
here, based on conduct?
MR. BOLLINGER: You would think that there would be, but if you look at
the Bayonne Medical Center case,24 which is the next one, it’s the same
situation. Here, the plaintiff brought the action in the bankruptcy court, saw
that things weren’t going their way, and they all of a sudden raised Stern and
said, “I don’t want the bankruptcy judge to deal with this.” And so the court
said, “There’s consent here. How can you just do this blatant forum shopping?
There’s consent here.” But then he started to think about whether or not
consent was effective, and he basically punted on the issue. He said, “What
I’m going to do is, I’m going to conclude that there is jurisdiction, but if it is
ultimately determined that there was no jurisdiction, then this order can be
considered findings of fact and conclusions of law that then can be approved
under § 157(a)(1).” What about this concept of just sort of pushing the issue to
the next level? Does that make sense? Does that help anybody?

24 Bayonne Med. Ctr. v. Bayonne/Omni Dev., LLC (In re Bayonne Med. Ctr.), No. 07-15195 (MS), 2011
Bankr. LEXIS 4748 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2011).
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JUDGE MASSEY: The question, though, is what the court is going to do with
it when it gets there, particularly if you’ve got a lot of money involved and you
want it to stick.
Since we’re running out of time, I’m going to move ahead with one little
thing that I was going to talk about, which is a 2003 Supreme Court case called
Roell v. Withrow.25 In that case, a full-time magistrate judge, under a statute
that permitted magistrate judges to try cases, was assigned a civil rights case
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by three prisoners against the prison staff for
allegedly not taking care of their medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. During the preliminary hearing, the magistrate judge told one of
them that the district judge could preside over the case and that person agreed,
and then later in writing confirmed that. Without waiting for any other
decision, the district judge referred the whole thing to the magistrate judge for
the final disposition. The referral order, which I presume the plaintiffs got, said
that it would be vacated if nobody consented. One of the three gave a written
consent and the other two didn’t say anything.
The case went all the way to the jury, and I don’t remember who won, but
there was an appeal and, because the thing was treated as if a district judge had
rendered the appeal, it went to the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit said, “Was
there consent?” They sent it back down to answer that. The magistrate judge
said, “Well, there was no express consent, and I think there needed to be
express consent, so I just wasted my time trying that case.” And the district
court adopted that report and recommendation; it went up to the circuit and the
circuit affirmed. It was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court
reversed, 5–4. They said there was consent, and it’s got kind of this
participation idea, and that there had to be some practical understanding of all
of this.
And here’s the wrinkle. The wrinkle is that among the four were Scalia,
Thomas, and Kennedy. Stephens was also one of the dissenters. Chief Justice
Rehnquist was in the majority, as was Justice Souter, and of course they’re off
now. So if it’s going to be perceived as—if Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito were to throw in with the other three—then anything short of a written
consent ahead of time wouldn’t work. Dan and I have talked about this, and I
tend to agree with Dan. I think that the Chief Justice is going to be a little more

25

Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003).
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pragmatic, perhaps, on this issue. But it just goes to show how hard it is to
figure out what you have to do.
MR. BUSSEL: The other issue you have is, does consent even work?
Because after all, we’re in a law school, where you learn that you can’t create
federal jurisdiction by consent. That’s a fundamental principle of federal
jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the parties. It
can only be conferred by the statute.
MR. BOLLINGER: It can be raised any time.
MR. BUSSEL: And it can be raised any time. You can’t waive it. You can
raise it on appeal, even though you didn’t raise it below. And so the question
is, is there a viable consent doctrine? If you go that far and you say, even
consent doesn’t work, you’ve really ripped a big hole in the fabric of the
system. Because to lie in the weeds and take an adverse judgment and not raise
the issue and then raise it on appeal, and be able to press it on appeal, is
extremely disruptive.
JUDGE MASSEY: I’ll tell you that Congress has been very generous with the
judiciary over the years, but every year for the last six, seven, eight years, the
Judicial Conference has gone to great lengths to try to save money in lots of
different ways. The Conference is very concerned about the possibility of
major cuts to the budget. That’s not going to affect the salaries of Article III
judges, but it could affect how long it takes to get a case through the federal
system. If consent were not possible, then I don’t see how you could avoid
having another 1,500 or so Article III judges, and the Article III judges don’t
particularly want that and neither does Congress, so hopefully the Court will
take that practical advice to mind.
MR. BUSSEL: Well, we promised them an opportunity to ask questions.
We’re kind of running late. Do you want to throw it open to the floor?
MR. BOLLINGER: Judge Massey, do you have any other practical tips you
want to bring up quickly before we go to questions?
JUDGE MASSEY: One thing that I would point out is when you start
analyzing the core, the items that are in the part of 28 U.S.C. § 157 that lists
core proceedings, think about issues like who else is affected—who besides
debtors and creditors are affected, and does the matter that’s to be adjudicated
have the distinct odor of a matter that could’ve been tried in front of a jury in
1791.
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I’ll just throw out a couple of ideas. Section 363(h) of the Bankruptcy
Code26 permits the sale of non-debtor property. As far as the debtor is
concerned, the property is property of the estate. It’s right there. There’s no
dispute about it. Does the bankruptcy judge have the authority to order the sale
of other people who just happen to have the bad luck of owning a piece of
property with the debtor? Think about the effect that might have on them. Or
on the turnover of property of the estate—that seems pretty straightforward.
Well, what if the property of the estate is not in the possession of the debtor at
the time of the filing and there’s a dispute about whether it’s property of the
estate? Or suppose the property of the estate is a tax refund and the debtor in
the chapter 7 case wasn’t advised properly or ignored the advice of the attorney
or just didn’t know and spends the tax refund postpetition? It’s received
postpetition, spent postpetition, property of the estate. Now the trustee wants a
turnover of the property of the estate. It doesn’t exist anymore. I personally
have questioned whether you can do that by motion, but maybe you could
since the debtor is involved. But it sounds like conversion, doesn’t it? It sounds
like conversion.
Or what about avoiding liens against real property under § 544, or any kind
of property under § 544?27 Some of those kinds of claims that get made there
could easily have been made in state court. It’s not easy to figure out what the
answer to all of this is. One way that some judges have tried to finesse this is to
put in an opinion saying, I think I’ve got jurisdiction. That’s kind of the
bankruptcy practitioner/judge point of view that the Chief Justice says is not
going to make a big ripple. This is just about this one case. There’s one in
particular out of the Southern District that I read where the bankruptcy judge
said, I’m going to render a judgment on this fraudulent transfer claim, but if I
didn’t really have the authority to do so, please accept these findings of fact
and conclusions of law as proposals. But a lot of the district courts now are
saying flat-out that fraudulent transfer claims are matters that have to come
before an Article III judge unless there’s consent.
MR. BOLLINGER: Well, you have now witnessed the difficulty of
squeezing a five-hour topic into about an hour. Jeremy, should we take a few
minutes for questions or would you rather stay on schedule? We’re happy to do
either. One question. Anybody have a real urgent question?
MR. BUSSEL: Is it your question?
26
27

See 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (2006).
See id. § 544.
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MR. BOLLINGER: If you have a question, go ahead and go to the
microphone.
JUDGE MASSEY: No judges please.
MR. BUSSEL: That’s what we need is judges.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: . . . statutory authority to estimate claims,
presumably over the opposition of the creditor who doesn’t want his claim
estimated. There’s a huge body of law about the bankruptcy court needing to
be efficient and orderly and get the administration done, and not holding it up
for a long period of time, which Stern v. Marshall is doing. So, is a possible
statutory solution to give all the other chapter folks the same estimation power
as in chapter 11, to benefit the economy in getting the estate resolved? And it
just works in bankruptcy court, and if you want to go litigate it in state court,
feel free, but for purposes of this estate, we’re going to estimate the claim.
What do you think?
MR. BOLLINGER: Dan or Judge Massey?
MR. BUSSEL: I think that you can do better than that. With respect to claims
against the estate, I just can’t believe that that’s not still within the core
jurisdiction. I think you can allow or disallow the claim, and it’s a final
judgment. If you’re suggesting that you can estimate the counterclaim, I don’t
think that’s going to be a binding judgment. I think that you’re going to run
headlong into Stern v. Marshall if you’re talking about a claim out, a
counterclaim against the creditor. If you’re talking about a claim in, a claim
against the estate, I think the bankruptcy judge can continue to do what they’ve
always done, which is by final order allow or disallow the claim.
MR. BOLLINGER: Judge Massey wanted to bring up a particular case on
whether or not claims were a slam dunk.
JUDGE MASSEY: I’ll let the case speak for itself as the counterargument.
MR. BUSSEL: That case is wrong, by the way.
JUDGE MASSEY: It’s the case of In re Colony Beach & Tennis Club
Association, Inc. decided last July.28 In that case, there was a dispute between a
limited partnership and an association of homeowners. The association
28 Colony Beach & Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass’n (In re Colony Beach &
Tennis Club Ass’n), 456 B.R. 545 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
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members—the homeowners—were members of the association by virtue of
buying the homes and they became limited partners, so they were part of both
entities. The dispute was over who had the responsibility of maintaining
certain common areas. Was it the partnership which had a hotel, which was
generating some revenue? Or was it homeowners, which would have to be
done by assessment? And so the dispute ended up in state court. The
partnership sued the association. The association filed bankruptcy. The
bankruptcy judge ruled for the debtor. Steve Merryday was the district judge.
You’ve got to read it. He was not particularly happy with how the bankruptcy
judge handled the factual analysis. He determined that the allowance of that
claim was strictly a matter of how you interpret the contract involving the
association under state law. Congress may have said it was a core matter, but it
required an Article III judge to determine the amount of that claim. The
problem with that, of course, is every claim just about arises under state law.
And that is the ultimate nightmare.
MR. BOLLINGER: I have one more person sitting at—
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I just have two follow-up comments to keep in mind
in all this discussion. One, Article III does not require presidential
appointment. It does not require confirmation by the Senate to be an Article III
judge. You look confused. Look at Article II that gives Congress the right to
vest the appointment of inferior officers in, among other things, courts of law,
just like the current system.
The second comment, just to keep in mind theoretically, Stern v. Marshall is
not about jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court because bankruptcy courts do not
have any jurisdiction. All of the jurisdiction is in the district court. Stern v.
Marshall is about how much authority the bankruptcy judge has to determine
these matters.
MR. BUSSEL: I think the second point is an important point. That’s really the
answer to the you-can’t-consent argument, is to make a distinction between the
subject matter jurisdiction which is vested in the federal district court, but the
right of the allocation of authority between bankruptcy court and federal
district court—that’s not subject matter jurisdiction. That’s a kind of lesser
jurisdiction and consent can cure a defect there.
JUDGE MASSEY: And that’s why you want to be sure if you get consent that
it doesn’t just say, “We agree, the bankruptcy judge has jurisdiction.”
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MR. BUSSEL: That’s critical. On the Article III point, I think that the
problem is that you can’t assign the judicial power of the United States to an
inferior officer. You have to assign it to a judge that’s appointed consistent
with the restrictions of Article III.
MR. BOLLINGER: Okay. Thank you very much. I apologize for going over,
but thank you very much for your time.

